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EMBEDDING THE GLOBAL 
IN THE NATIONAL:
Implications for the Role of the State1
Saskia Sassen
One role of the state vis-à-vis today’s global economy has been to
negotiate the intersection of national law and foreign actors—whether
firms, markets, or supranational organizations. This condition makes
the current phase distinctive. We have, on the one hand, an enor-
mously elaborate body of law that secures the exclusive territoriality of
national states to an extent not before seen and, on the other, the con-
siderable institutionalizing of the “rights” of non-national firms, cross-
border transactions, and supranational organizations. The conditions
bring with them an almost necessary engagement of national states in
the process of globalization.
We generally use terms such as deregulation, financial and trade
liberalization, and privatization to describe the outcome of this negoti-
ation. Unfortunately, however, such terms only capture the with-
drawal of the state from regulating its economy. They do not register
all the ways in which the state participates in setting up the new frame-
works that encourage globalization; nor do they capture the associated
transformations inside the state.
Some scholarship treats the relationship between national states and
the world economy in a way that transcends the proposition that the
state simply withdraws from the economic sphere. The world-system
literature has made major contributions toward developing analytic
categories that allow us to understand the operation of international
dynamics inside the national territories of less developed countries. An
emerging body of scholarship shows that, to a large extent, global
processes materialize in national territories, including those of the
highly developed countries. I have long argued that many transactions
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that are essential to the global economy do not cross borders, or they
do not do so the way that investment and trade do, but are located
inside national economies. Further, I have tried to show how even the
most digitalized global financial market is grounded in a set of very
material resources and spaces largely embedded in national territories.
Less attention, and the concern here, has gone to the formation of an
emerging institutional framework to govern the global economy and
the inevitable implications this has for the exclusive authority of the
modern national state over its territory—that is, its exclusive territori-
ality. A new set of intermediary strategic agents contributes to the
management and coordination of the global economy. They are
largely, though not exclusively, private. And they have absorbed some
of the international functions carried out by states in the recent past, as
was the case, for instance, with the predominantly protectionist
regimes of the post – World War II decades through which govern-
ments governed international trade. The role of these strategic agents
is dramatically illustrated by a recent case involving China. When the
Chinese government in 1996 issued a 100-year bond to be sold not in
Shanghai but mostly in New York, it could bypass Washington and
deal directly with one of the leading financial-services firms, J. P. Mor-
gan. Similar situations have occurred repeatedly in various other coun-
tries.
Private firms in international finance, accounting and law, the new
private standards for international accounting and financial reporting,
credit rating agencies, international commercial arbitrations, and
supranational organizations such as the WTO all play strategic non-
government-centered governance functions. They do so, however,
largely within national states and, as a result, inevitably become agents
or carriers of the legal and accounting rules of that state. This signals
the possibility of a whole series of engagements with various aspects
of national states and various outcomes that depend on the specifics of
each national state.
First, I explore one way of theorizing this necessary engagement
between national states and global actors. And, second, I will focus on
the spaces of economic globalization as a way of capturing their rela-
tion to national territories.
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II. Constructing an Analytic Frontier Zone2
The encounter of a global actor—firm or market—with one or another
instantiation of the national state can be thought of as a new frontier
zone. It is not merely a dividing line between the national economy
and the global economy. It is a zone of politico-economic interactions
that produces new institutional forms and alters some of the old ones.
Nor is it just a matter of reducing regulations or the role of government
generally. For instance, in many countries, the necessity for
autonomous central banks in the current global economic system has
required a thickening of regulations in order to delink central banks
from the influence of the executive branch of government.
This zone of interaction is highly charged, and potentially the out-
comes of this interaction can produce epochal change. Why is it highly
charged and significant? Because it is not simply the push by global
firms and markets that is shaping the dynamics of interaction,
although this is implied in much of the literature on the declining sig-
nificance of the national state under globalization. States are also shap-
ing the dynamics of interaction and are doing so not merely through
resistance. At the same time, they are reconfigured. This reconfigura-
tion is shaped both by trends toward standardization (as is the grow-
ing convergence in the role of central banks) and national
particularities.
The tension between the weight of national specificity and the
weight of the new global rules of the game is well illustrated by some
aspects of the current Asian financial crisis. We are seeing different
responses by the Asian countries involved in IMF “rescue packages,”
signaling the weight of specific domestic institutional arrangements
and leadership. At the same time, the emergent consensus in the com-
munity of states to further globalization has created a set of specific
obligations on participating states, no matter how reluctant some of
them might be.
Beyond the inadequacy of simply accepting the general proposition
of a declining significance of the state, there is also the problematic
acceptance of a simple quantitative measure of globalization. Simply to
focus on the often minimal share of foreign inputs in national
economies overlooks some of the salient features of the current phase
of the global economy. In most developed countries, the share of for-
eign in total investment, the share of international in total trade, and
the share of foreign in total stock market value are all very small. How-
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ever, to infer from this that economic globalization is not really a sig-
nificant issue misses a crucial feature: most global processes material-
ize in national territories and do so largely through national
institutional arrangements, from legislative acts to firms, and, there-
fore, are not necessarily counted as “foreign.”
Conversely, for that same reason, we cannot simply assume that,
because a transaction takes place in national territory and in a national
institutional setting, it is ipso facto national. In my reading, the over-
lapping of global actors and national institutions is far more ambigu-
ous. The case of the central banks today also illustrates another key
aspect in the process whereby national economies accommodate a
global economic system. Central banks are institutionalizing in their
national economies some of the criteria that are key to IMF conditional-
ity. This signals that “national” institutions can become home to some
of the operational rules of the global economic system.
Here I want to focus on some of the actual territorial and nonterrito-
rial processes through which the global economy is constituted in
order to clarify the interactions between national states and global
actors and the ways some of the dynamics that constitute the global
economy operate through national institutions and in national territo-
ries. Analytically, the discussion is centered in this notion of a frontier
zone where many different outcomes are possible.
In my judgment, one of the key processes today is the relocation of
national public governance functions to transnational private arenas
and, conversely, the development inside national states—through leg-
islative acts, court rulings, executive orders — of the mechanisms nec-
essary to accommodate the rights of global capital in what are still
national territories under the exclusive control of their states.
One overall effect is what I call an incipient denationalizing of sev-
eral highly specialized national institutional orders — the partial
replacement of national legal and regulatory frameworks with dena-
tionalized ones. One concrete version of this may well be the shift
away from what are ultimately still Keynesian state agendas toward
the needs of global capital to ensure its “rights” inside national territo-
ries. This is one way in which the state matters under conditions of
globalization — that is, in its capacity as an administrative and techni-
cal apparatus that can be used to govern the operations of national as
well as non-national economic actors and institutions. If some of the
instruments necessary to accommodate a global economic system are
implemented inside the national state through a denationalizing of
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select institutional realms, one could argue that what we could call
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty may well be undergo-
ing substantive transformations, even though formally or de jure they
may appear unchanged and unchallenged by globalization.
III. Subnational Spaces of the Global Economy
We can begin to address these questions by examining how some of
the major processes of economic globalization get installed in national
institutional and geographic spaces.
Each phase in the long history of the world economy raises specific
questions about the particular conditions that made it possible. A key
property of the current phase is the ascendance of information tech-
nologies, the associated increase in the mobility and liquidity of capi-
tal, and the resulting decline in the capacity of national states to
regulate key sectors of their economies. This is well illustrated by the
case of the leading information industries, finance, and the advanced
corporate services; these industries tend to have a space economy that
is transnational and to have outputs that are hypermobile, moving
instantaneously around the globe.
The master images in the currently dominant account about eco-
nomic globalization emphasize precisely these aspects: hypermobility,
global communications, and the neutralization of place and distance.
There is a tendency in that account to take the existence of a global eco-
nomic system as a given, a function of the power of transnational cor-
porations and global communications. But the capabilities need to be
produced for global operation, coordination, and control contained in
the new information technologies and in the power of transnational
corporations. By focusing on the production of these capabilities, we
add a neglected dimension to the familiar issue of the power of large
corporations and the new technologies. The emphasis shifts to the prac-
tices that constitute what we call economic globalization and global
control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and
management of a global production system and a global marketplace
for finance, both under conditions of economic concentration.
A focus on practices draws the categories of place and production
process into the analysis of economic globalization. These two cate-
gories are easily overlooked in accounts centered on the hypermobility
of capital and the power of transnationals. Developing categories such
as place and production process does not negate the centrality of
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hypermobility and power. Rather, it emphasizes that many of the
resources necessary for global economic activities are not hypermobile
and are, indeed, deeply embedded in place, notably global cities and
export-processing zones.
Further, emphasizing the fact that global processes are at least
partly embedded in national territories introduces new variables in
current conceptions about economic globalization and the shrinking
regulatory role of the state. That is to say, the space economy for major
new transnational economic processes diverges in significant ways
from the duality global/national presupposed in much analysis of the
global economy. The duality, national versus global, suggests two
mutually exclusive spaces — where one begins the other ends. But I
contend that this is fundamentally incorrect, that the global material-
izes by necessity in specific places and institutional arrangements, a
good number of which, if not most, are located in national territories.
Recapturing the geography of places involved in globalization
allows us to recapture people, workers, communities, and more specif-
ically, the many different work cultures besides the corporate culture
that are involved in the work of globalization.
IV. The Role of Place in a Global Economy
Globalization can be deconstructed in terms of the strategic sites where
global processes materialize and the linkages that bind them. Among
these sites are export-processing zones, offshore banking centers, and
on a far more complex level, global cities. This produces a specific
geography of globalization and underlines the extent to which it is not
a planetary event encompassing all the world.3 It is, furthermore, a
geography that has changed over the last few centuries and over the
last few decades — and, most recently, has come to include electronic
space.4
This geography of globalization contains both a dynamic of disper-
sal and of centralization, a condition that is only now beginning to
receive recognition. The massive trend toward the worldwide spatial
dispersal of economic activities which we associate with globalization
has contributed to a demand for new forms of territorial centralization
of top-level management and control operations. The new possibilities
for spatial dispersal made possible by telematics actually contributes
to an expansion of central functions if this dispersal is to take place
under the continuing concentration in control, ownership, and profit
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appropriation that characterizes the current economic system.5 This
dynamic is also evident for firms operating at the regional or national
level.
National and global markets, as well as globally integrated organi-
zations, require central places where the work of globalization gets
done.6 Further, information industries require a vast physical infra-
structure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentration of facili-
ties. We need to distinguish between the capacity for global
transmission/communication and the material conditions that make
this possible. Finally, even the most advanced information industries
have a production process that is at least partly place-bound because it
requires a combination of resources even when the outputs are hyper-
mobile.
A central concern in my work has been to look at cities as produc-
tion sites for the leading information industries of our time and to
recover the infrastructure of activities, firms, and jobs that is necessary
to run the advanced corporate economy.7 These industries are typically
conceptualized in terms of the hypermobility of their outputs and the
high levels of expertise of their professionals rather than in terms of the
production process involved and the requisite infrastructure of facili-
ties and nonexpert jobs that are also part of these industries.
Viewed this way, these processes of globalization take place, at least
partly, in national territories and hence contain, explicitly or implicitly,
a participation of select components of national states. There are two
major implications here for the question of territoriality and sover-
eignty in the context of a global economy. First, when there is geo-
graphic dispersal of factories, offices, and service outlets in an
integrated corporate system (particularly one with centralized top-
level control), there is also a growth in central functions. In other
words, the more globalized firms become, the more their central func-
tions grow—in importance, in complexity, in number of transactions.8
Of importance to the analysis here is the dynamic that connects the dis-
persal of economic activities with the ongoing weight and often
growth of central functions. In terms of territoriality and globalization,
this means that an interpretation of the impact of globalization as cre-
ating a space economy that extends beyond the regulatory capacity of
a single state is only half the story; the other half is that these central
functions are disproportionately concentrated in major cities, and that
means in the national territories.
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By “central functions” I mean not only top-level headquarters but
also all the top-level financial, legal, accounting, managerial, executive,
and planning functions necessary to run a corporate organization
operating in more than one country and, increasingly, in several coun-
tries. These central functions are partly embedded in headquarters but
also, in good part, in what has been called the corporate services com-
plex — that is, the network of financial, legal, accounting, advertising,
and other corporate services firms that handle the complexities of
operating in more than one national legal system, national accounting
system, advertising culture, and so on and do so under conditions of
rapid innovations in all these fields.9 These agglomerations of top-level
firms producing central functions for the management and coordina-
tion of global economic systems are disproportionately concentrated in
the highly developed countries — particularly, though not exclusively,
in the kinds of cities I call “global cities.” But similar trends are becom-
ing evident in major cities such as São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Seoul,
Bangkok, etc. This concentration of functions represents a strategic fac-
tor in the organization of the global economy, and it is situated in
national territories, not somewhere “out there” in some putative global
economy that exists beyond national territories.
Another instance today of this negotiation between a transnational
process or dynamic and a national territory is that of the global finan-
cial markets. The orders of magnitude in these transactions have risen
sharply, as illustrated by the U.S. $75 trillion in turnover in the global
capital market (as estimated by the Economist), a major component of
the global economy. These transactions are partly embedded in
telecommunications systems that make possible the instantaneous
transmission of money/information around the globe. This feature has
attracted considerable attention. But the other half of the story is the
extent to which the global financial markets are located in particular
cities in the highly developed countries; indeed, the degrees of concen-
tration are unexpectedly high. The topography of activities in many of
the global digitalized industries, such as finance, actually weaves in
and out of digital space; and when it moves out of digital space and
hits the ground, it does so in massive concentrations of very material
resources, from infrastructure to buildings.
Operating a worldwide network of factories, offices, and service
outlets and implementing global financial markets require major and
minor innovations in national legal systems and the creation of whole
new frameworks outside national systems. This is, in my opinion, one
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of the components of the new geography of power confronting and
involving national states. Some of these legal innovations entail spe-
cific forms of interaction with the state or, more specifically, with the
sovereignty of the state. Such innovations and changes are often cate-
gorized as “deregulation” and taken as something of a given. In much
social science, deregulation is another name for the declining signifi-
cance of the state. There is, it seems to me, a more specific process con-
tained in these legal changes, one that, along with the reconfiguration
of space previously discussed, may signal a more fundamental trans-
formation in the matter of sovereignty.
For instance, over the past twenty years, international commercial
arbitration has been transformed and institutionalized as the leading
contractual method for resolving transnational commercial disputes.10
According to Dezalay and Garth, it is a delocalized and decentralized
market for the administration of international commercial disputes,
connected by more or less powerful institutions and individuals who
are both competitive and complementary. Its purpose is to bypass
national court systems.11 A second instance of a private regulatory sys-
tem is represented by debt security or bond rating agencies, which
play an increasingly important role in the global economy.12 Ten years
ago Moody’s and Standard and Poor had no analysts outside the
United States; by 1993, each had about 100 in Europe, Japan, and Aus-
tralia.13
These and other such transnational institutions and regimes raise
questions about the relation between state sovereignty and the gover-
nance of global economic processes. International commercial arbitra-
tion is basically a private justice system and credit rating agencies are
private gatekeeping systems. Along with other such institutions, they
have emerged as important governance mechanisms whose authority
is not centered in the state. They serve to maintain order at the top. Of
particular concern here is how the newly formed World Trade Organi-
zation negotiates the growth of these private regimes and the attempt
to form supranational regimes still centered on states and the interstate
system. As Rosenau has noted, precisely because so many processes
are transnational, governments increasingly are not competent to
address some of the major issues confronting our societies; this is not
the end of sovereignty, but rather an alteration in the “exclusivity and
scope” of the competence of governments.14
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Thus, while central, the role of the state in producing the legal
encasements for economic activity is no longer what it was in earlier
periods.
V. Conclusion
The strategic spaces where global processes are embedded are often
national; the mechanisms through which new legal forms, necessary
for globalization, are implemented are often part of national state insti-
tutions; and the infrastructure that makes possible the hypermobility
of financial capital at the global scale is embedded in various national
territories. This partial embedding of global dynamics in national terri-
tories in a context of exclusive territorial authority by the national state
signals a necessary engagement with the national state. The national
state could not be a mere bystander or passive victim. It had to partici-
pate through one or another of its instantiations in setting up the new
legal frameworks and in legitimating the new norms. In this process, it
weakened many of its authorities, especially those linked to the social
fund, but it also gained new powers. Thinking about globalization and
the national state along these lines resists the simple duality of the
national and the global and the notion that economic globalization is
basically a set of macro-level cross-border processes.
One way of conceptualizing the multiple negotiations between the
national state and the implementation of a global economic system is
as a process of incipient denationalizing of select specialized national
institutional orders. This process of denationalization cannot be
reduced to a geographic conception, which the generals who fought
the wars for nationalizing territory in earlier centuries attempted to do.
This is a denationalizing of specific institutional arenas: the financial
sectors in Manhattan and the City of London are the equivalent of free-
trade zones. But Manhattan as a geographic entity, with all its layers of
activity and functions and regulations, is not a free-trade zone. What
becomes denationalized is a highly specialized functional or institu-
tional realm, with strong tendencies toward locational concentration in
places such as Manhattan and London’s City. Some of what we code as
national because it takes place in national territory has become the
global. And some of what we code as global is contingent on the
national state as an administrative capacity and as a source of legiti-
macy. 
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Notes
1. This paper is part of a larger five-year project on governance and accountability in the
global economy. The first phase of the larger project was partly published as the 1995
Leonard Hastings Schoff Memorial Lectures: Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of
Globalization (Columbia University Press, 1996). I want to thank the Schoff Memorial
Fund for its support and Columbia University Press for allowing me to use portions of
that book.
2. Elsewhere, I have developed the broader concept of analytic borderlands (see Sassen
1996b).
3. Compare with Robertson’s notion of the world as a single place, or the “global human
condition.” I contend that globalization is also a process that produces differentiation,
except that the alignment of differences is unlike that associated with such differentiat-
ing notions as national character, national culture, national society. For example, the cor-
porate world today has a global geography, but it isn’t everywhere in the world: in fact,
it has highly defined and structured spaces. Furthermore, it is sharply differentiated
from noncorporate segments in the economies of the particular locations (a city such as
New York) or countries where it operates. There is homogenization along certain lines
that cross national boundaries and sharp differentiation inside these boundaries. We can
also see this in the geography of certain built forms—from the bungalow (King 1984) to
the corporate complex (Sassen 1991) to the landscapes of American theme parks (Zukin
1991). These various built forms are both global yet highly localized in certain places. In
this sense, globalized forms and processes tend to have a distinct geography.
4. We should recognize the specific historical conditions for different conceptions of the
international or the global. There is a tendency to see the internationalization of the econ-
omy as a process operating at the center, embedded in the power of the multinational
corporations today and colonial enterprises in the past. One could note that the
economies of many peripheral countries are thoroughly internationalized because of
high levels of foreign investments in all economic sectors and heavy dependence on
world markets for “hard” currency. Center countries have strategic concentrations of
firms and markets that operate globally, the capability for global control and coordina-
tion, and power. This form of the international is very different from what we find in
peripheral countries.
5. More conceptually, we can ask whether an economic system with strong tendencies
toward such concentration can have a space economy that lacks points of physical
agglomeration. That is to say, does power—in this case, economic power—have spatial
correlates?
6. I see the producer services, and most especially finance and advanced corporate ser-
vices, as industries producing the organizational commodities necessary to implement
and manage global economic systems (Sassen 1991, chapters 2–5). Producer services are
intermediate outputs—that is, services bought by firms. They cover financial, legal, and
general management matters, innovation, development, design, administration, person-
nel, production technology, maintenance, transport, communications, wholesale distrib-
ution, advertising, cleaning services for firms, security, and storage. Central components
of the producer-services category are a range of industries with mixed business and con-
sumer markets; they are insurance, banking, financial services, real estate, legal services,
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accounting, and professional associations. (For more detailed discussions, see Noyelle
and Dutka 1988; Daniels 1985.)
7. Methodologically speaking, this is one way of addressing the question of the unit of
analysis in studies of contemporary economic processes. “National economy” is a prob-
lematic category when there are high levels of internationalization. And “world econ-
omy” is a problematic category because of the impossibility of engaging in detailed
empirical study at that scale. Highly internationalized cities such as New York or Lon-
don offer the possibility of examining globalization processes in great detail, within a
bounded setting, and with all their multiple, often contradictory aspects. It would begin
to address some of the questions raised by King about the need of a differentiated notion
of culture, but also of the international and the global (King 1990).
8. I have elaborated these issues in Sassen 1991. This process of corporate integration
should not be confused with vertical integration as conventionally defined. See also Ger-
effi on commodity chains and Porter’s value-added chains, two constructs that also illus-
trate the difference between corporate integration at a world scale and vertical
integration as conventionally defined.
9. Such services have become so specialized and complex that headquarters increasingly
buy them from specialized firms rather than producing them in-house. It is not so much
headquarters as the specialized network of service firms that tends to locational concen-
tration in major cities (Sassen 1991; 1994).
10. Today, international business contracts in a broad range of activities typically call for
arbitration in the event of a dispute arising from the contractual arrangement (Dezalay
and Garth 1995). The main reason given for this choice is that it allows each party to
avoid being forced to submit to the courts of the other. Also important is the secrecy of
the process. Such arbitration can be “institutional” and follow the rules of institutions
such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the American Arbitration
Association, the London Court of International Commercial Arbitration, or many others.
Or it can be ad hoc, often following the rules of the U.N. Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The arbitrators — usually three — are private individuals
selected by the parties; they act as private judges, holding hearings and issuing judg-
ments.
11. See also Salacuse 1991.
12. The two agencies that dominate the market in ratings, with listings of U.S. $3 trillion
each, are Moody’s Investors Service, usually referred to as Moody’s, and Standard &
Poor’s Ratings Group, usually referred to as Standard & Poor.
13. Sinclair 1994
14. A wider systemic process here needs to be distinguished from the effects of global-
ization: the worldwide and apparently growing distrust of governments and bureaucra-
cies. Shapiro (1995) finds that this has contributed to the emergence of certain
commonalities in law, notably the growing importance of constitutional individual
rights that protect the individual from the state and other organizations. The particular
hallmark of American constitutionalism is constitutional judicial review, which now has
also emerged endogenously in Germany and Italy and, to some extent, even in France
(where there now is an active constitutional court and a constitutional bill of rights). The
Court of Justice of the EU has evolved into a constitutional court with human-rights
jurisdiction (which entailed that constitutions and rights had to come about in Europe).
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